"Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power."

— Foucault, Michel. 1980. Two Lectures. In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977. (p. 98)

"what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, on the knower’s straying afield of himself?"

— Michel Foucault 1986, p. 8 (In Shaviro, Without Criteria)

"For myself, I prefer to utilize writers I like. The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest."

— Foucault, Michel. “Prison Talk,” in Power/Knowledge (1980: p. 37-54).

"We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality. It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim—through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality—to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance."

— Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (1990 [1978], p. 157)

"The intellectual no longer has to play the role of the advisor. The project, tactics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can so is to provide instruments of analysis… In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battlefield—that is the intellectual’s role."

— Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings (1980: p. 62)

"To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of law. If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the state apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive: the army as a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, and so on. I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state…because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth. …this metapower can with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis for the great negative forms of power."

— Michael Foucault, The Foucault-Chomsky Debate: On Human Nature (2006: p. 156-157) (via fuckyeahanarchism)

"philosophy and right, or philisophico-juridical discourse, would rather give the State too much power than not enough power, and while they do criticize Hobbes for giving the State too much power, they are secretly grateful to him for having warded off a certain insidious and barbarous enemy. …It is this discourse of struggle and permanent civil war that Hobbes wards off by making all wars and conquests depend upon a contract, and by thus rescuing the theory of the State."

— Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976 (2003, p. 98-99)

Tags: Foucault

"it is the fact that power is exercised through both right and disciplines, that the techniques of discipline and discourses born of discipline are invading right, and that normalizing procedures are increasingly colonizing the procedures of the law… That is why we now find ourselves in a situation where the only existing and apparently solid recourse we have against the usurpations of disciplinary mechanics and against the rise of a power that is bound up with scientific knowledge is precisely a recourse or a return to a right that is organized around sovereignty, or that is articulated on that old principle."

— Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976 (2003, p. 38-39)

Tags: Foucault

"The code elements that concern the economy of pleasures, conjugal fidelity, and relations between men may well remain analogous, but they will derive from a profoundly altered ethics and from a different way of constituting oneself as the ethical subject of one’s sexual behavior."

— Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self (1986, p. 240)

Misunderstanding: Applying Modernity Where It Doesn’t Belong

In The Gayncients, Out.com traces the Hollywood portrayal of homosexuality in ancient Greece. As a preface, ancient Greece conceived of sexuality much differently than that of the modern Western—to be sure, it is perhaps inaccurate to even apply our term “sexuality,” and I only do so to help us understand what we’re exploring here. That said, an aspect of one’s coming-to-manhood in ancient Greece was the expectation that he would entertain the sexual advances and desires of older, more distinguished men. Sexual practices were evaluated not on the subject of desire, but instead on the object of pleasure; it was not on whom the act was performed but the act itself that was susceptible to judgment.

Yet the manner in which the article manages itself is problematic. For one, the article is framed by this question: “we ask just how gay were the real ancients?” This frame clearly misses the subject of desire-object of pleasure distinction: sexual encounters between two men where not evaluated on this fact, but on the acts themselves which were expected to exhibit a sort of moderation. Next, with regard to Spartacus, the group of slaves that fought their way out of gladiator school, the article draws attention to the “very gay” TV series, and the historical account which does not acknowledge “gayness.” Again, what does the insertion of the modern conception of “gay” into a society which did not make such considerations do to the society in question? The examples above, which are not anomalous to the article, but recurrent, are informed by the conception of sexuality as static across time and space. It is thus portrayed as external to the individual, to groups, and by implication, to the power relations which create and shape each. 

It is interesting to observe at least a somewhat mainstream cultural publication, Out, attempt to wade through the mainstream popularization/problematization of Greek sexuality; even in its attempt to demystify the nature of “gayness” in ancient Greece, the article misses an important piece of analysis provided by Michel Foucault in the second volume of his The History of Sexuality. In his analysis of sexuality in ancient Greece, Foucault is clear of the fundamentally different notion it entailed: “The Greeks did not see love for one’s own sex and love for the other sex as opposites, as two exclusive choices, two radically different types of behavior. The dividing lines did not follow that kind of boundary” (The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, p. 187). A final example crystallizes the article’s disconnect in a series of ambiguous statements about the sexuality of Thebans and Alexander the Great: the Thebans are depicted as “one hundred-fifty homo couples, idolized by society, heroes to all, sworn to fight to the death to protect their love and homeland.” And this is followed by the dubious description of Alexander as the “…soon to be ‘the Great’ and very likely ‘the Gay’.” Further, noting a relationship between Alexander and Hephaestion, a general and great companion, the article concludes “the boy was very, very bi.” This final example is especially noteworthy for the image it produces: the figure of the warrior is not one modernity typically casts as gay. Foucault speaks to such analysis: “we can talk about their ‘bisexuality,’ thinking of the free choice they allowed themselves between the two sexes, but for them this option [did] not referred to a dual, ambivalent, and ‘bisexual’ structure of desire. To their way of thinking, what made it possible to desire a man or woman was simply the appetite that nature had implanted in man’s heart for ‘beautiful’ human beings, whatever their sex might be” (ibid, p. 188).

Accordingly, while the article attempts a clarification between the popularizes portrayal of gayness in ancient Greece and that of history, by failing to recognize the fluidity of sexuality across time and space the article instead contributes to the cultural spectacle that reinforces this very perspective; by embedding its analysis in modernity, it merely punctuates the conception of sexuality as outside of the subject, and thus out of control and static.